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THE PROBLEM OF ENFORCING NATURE’S RIGHTS 
UNDER ECUADOR’S CONSTITUTION: WHY THE 2008 
ENVIRONMENTAL AMENDMENTS HAVE NO BITE 
 
Mary Elizabeth Whittemore† 
Abstract: In 2008, Ecuador became the first nation to give rights to nature when 
it ratified constitutional amendments (new articles 71-74) that grant the environment the 
inalienable right to exist, persist, and be respected. Environmentalists hope Ecuador’s 
amendments will lead to improvement in a country devastated by resource exploitation, 
and that other countries will follow. Yet, many wonder whether the amendments will be 
enforced.  This comment argues that—all things considered—successful execution of the 
amendments is unlikely.  Ecuador’s President has not demonstrated a sincere intention or 
ability to implement the amendments.  Further, plaintiffs who sue under the amendments 
face significant legal barriers, such as Ecuador’s lack of a standing doctrine and a history 
of judicial corruption and dysfunction.  To counteract these problems, Ecuador should 
grant lifetime tenure to its constitutional court judges, codify a standing doctrine, create 
an independent enforcement body, and create an independent environmental tribunal with 
criminal contempt power. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
“We’re making history!  Onward!”  Ecuador’s President Rafael 
Correa rejoiced in late September 2008.1  President Correa was celebrating 
the news that voters had approved Ecuador’s new Constitution.2  He called 
the vote a “historic victory” and promised that it would incite “rapid, 
profound change” in Ecuador,3 an economically and politically fragile4 
equatorial country on the Pacific coast of South America.  This new 
Constitution promises many new rights, but it has primarily caught 
international attention because Ecuador is now the first nation in the world 
                                           
†
 J.D. Candidate at the University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2012.  Many thanks to 
Professor Gregory Hicks for his invaluable feedback, the staff of the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for 
their scrupulous editing, and her family for their patience and support.   
1
 Ecuadoreans Back New Constitution, BBC NEWS (Sept. 29, 2008), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7640704.stm.   
2
 Simon Romero, President Wins Support for Charter in Ecuador, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/29/world/americas/29ecuador.html. 
3
 New Ecuador Constitution Includes Gay Rights Guarantees, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 29, 
2008), http://www.365gay.com/news/new-ecuador-constitution-includes-gay-rights-guarantees/.   
4
 WORLD BANK, OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEPARTMENT, EVALUATIONS OF THE WORLD BANK 
GROUP’S ACTIVITIES IN THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES: BACKGROUND PAPER: ECUADOR COUNTRY CASE 
STUDY 1-2 (2003).   
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to grant inalienable, substantive rights to nature.5  
Other constitutions express commitment to environmental value, 6 but 
an anthropocentric7 format is more typical.  Ecuador, by contrast, now treats 
the environment as a right-bearing entity alongside and equal to humans. 
These provisions represent a shift in Ecuador (and perhaps Latin America 
generally) from an exclusively anthropocentric view of environmental rights 
to a more eco-centric view8 and have led some commentators to dub 
Ecuador’s Constitution the “most progressive in the world.”9  
Specifically, the new articles grant the environment the inalienable 
right to exist, persist, regenerate, and be respected.10  They also guarantee 
Ecuadorean citizens the right to sue for enforcement of these rights.11  Much 
of the attention the provisions have received has been cautiously positive; 
observers want to see how constitutional rights for nature may be 
enforceable and in what types of legal proceedings.12  Will they have what 
the legal community calls “teeth” in court?  Will other countries follow?   
It is significant that Ecuador is the first country in the world to codify 
such novel constitutional mandates.  Ecuador is home to at least eight groups 
of indigenous peoples, over thirteen million hectares of tropical rain forest in 
the Amazon basin,13 and the treasured Galápagos Islands.  Unfortunately, 
Ecuador is also home to an environmentally devastating oil industry that has 
                                           
5
 CONSTITUTIÓN POLITICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR, art. 56-60, available at 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador08.html#mozTocId64283 [hereinafter CONST. 
ECUADOR].  
6
 Out of approximately 190 nations in the world, the constitutions of 117 mention protection of the 
environment or natural resources.  EARTH JUSTICE, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS REPORT: HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT 37 (2005), available at http://www.earthjustice.org/library/references/2005_ 
ENVIRONMENTAL_RIGHTS_REPORTrev.pdf.  
7
 An anthropocentric (or “homocentric”) format grants environmental rights to human beings.  See 
Carolyn Merchant, Environmental Ethics and Political Conflict: A View from California, 12 ENV. ETHICS 
1, 52-57 (1990).  
8
 See CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, SHOULD TREES HAVE STANDING? LAW, MORALITY AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 164 (3d ed. 2010); Merchant, supra note 7, at 56; Myrl L. Duncan, The Rights of Nature: 
Triumph for Holism or Pyrrhic Victory? 31 WASHBURN L. J. 61, 67 (1992). 
9
 See, e.g., Clare Kendall, A New Law of Nature, THEGUARDIAN.CO.UK (Sept. 24, 2008), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/sep/24/equador.conservation; cf. David Takacs, Note, The 
Public Trust Doctrine, Environmental Human Rights, and the Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L. J. 711, 730 (2008) (positing that South Africa’s Constitution may be the world’s most 
progressive).  
10
 CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71. 
11
 Id. 
12
 See, e.g., Kendall, supra note 9. 
13
 Judith Kimerling, Disregarding Environmental Law: Petroleum Development in Protected 
Natural Areas and Indigenous Homelands in the Ecuadorean Amazon, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. 
REV. 849, 849 (1991). 
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caused vast deforestation in the Amazon,14 contaminated water, and rampant 
illness.15  In sum, it is not difficult to say that no country needs this 
amendment more than Ecuador.   
However, it remains unclear whether President Correa intends to 
implement these changes, or even has the resources necessary to do so.  As 
illustrated by the fact that President Correa is Ecuador’s eighth president in 
ten years,16 the last few decades of Ecuador’s government is best 
characterized by turmoil.17  The question of the amendments’ likelihood of 
success therefore provides an opportunity to examine the chances of fair 
environmental adjudication in Ecuador and its government’s practical ability 
to implement change.   
This comment examines the principal factors affecting Ecuador’s 
ability to execute these unique amendments and argues that, all things 
considered, successful execution of the environment provisions is unlikely in 
Ecuador’s legal and political environment.  Part II discusses the political 
barriers that hinder execution of the environmental provisions of the new 
Constitution—namely, a lack of government accountability and doubts about 
President Correa’s intention and ability to implement his promises.  Part III 
addresses the legal barriers to implementation: procedural confusion over 
standing and concerns with the structure and past corruption in Ecuador’s 
constitutional court.  Finally, Part IV suggests some ways that Ecuador could 
counteract these political and legal barriers and improve the likelihood of 
successful implementation.  Specifically, Ecuador needs to award lifetime 
tenure to its constitutional court judges, codify its standing doctrine, and 
create of an independent body for enforcement of environmental court 
rulings.   
                                           
14
 Ecuador’s deforestation rate is the highest in Latin America: it loses about 200,000 hectares per 
year, and in 2009, it had less than half its original forest.  See Daniel V. Ortega-Pacheco & Inés M. 
Manzano-Torres, Institutional Change and Climate Policy in Ecuador 6 (2009) (forthcoming in 
IMPLEMENTING THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES (M. 
Mehling, A. Merrill, & K. Upston-Hooper eds. 2011)).   
15
 Kimerling, supra note 13, at 849 (summarizing the contamination that resulted from Texaco’s 
operations in the Amazon); see also Kendall, supra note 9 (describing the contamination as the 
“Amazonian Chernobyl”).  In February 2011, an Ecuadorean court ended a seventeen-year lawsuit when it 
ordered Chevron to pay more than $9 billion in damages for polluting Ecuador’s Amazon jungle.  Chevron 
inherited the lawsuit when it acquired Texaco.  Clifford Krauss & Simon Romero, Ecuador Judge Orders 
Chevron to Pay $9 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, at A4 (Feb. 14, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/15/world/americas/15ecuador.html?scp=2&sq=Texaco&st=cse.  
16
 Daniel Schweimler, Ecuador: New Hopes and Challenges, BBC NEWS (Apr. 16, 2007), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6561961.stm; Simon Romero, Ecuador Vote: Leader Forges Middle 
Road Among Leftists, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2006), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04E4D7103EF93BA15752C1A9609C8B63&pagewante
d=all 
17
 See infra Part III.C.   
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II. THE AMENDMENTS WILL REMAIN MERE LIP SERVICE UNTIL PRESIDENT 
CORREA SHOWS A SINCERE ABILITY AND INTENTION TO IMPLEMENT 
THEM 
  A major problem with Ecuador’s new environmental provisions is 
the uncertainty over the executive’s ability and intention to implement them. 
The turnover rate in Ecuador’s executive has been so high in recent years 
that, as mentioned above, eight presidents have taken office in the span of a 
decade.18  Therefore, an analysis of the new amendments’ chances of success 
must properly account for the instability of the branch that created them.   
The amendments were President Correa’s brainchild; he proposed the 
new Constitution as part of his presidential campaign19 for “change.”20  
However, the extreme volatility of Ecuador’s executive leaves the new 
provisions vulnerable to neglect by current and future executives.  
Considering Ecuador’s rapid presidential turnover in the past decade, it is 
unclear how long President Correa will remain in office.  It is likewise 
unclear whether his successors will enforce the amendments, ignore them, or 
annul them with another constitutional amendment.  In this political climate 
where constitutional amendments are commonplace21 and presidencies 
fleeting, the success of the amendments in future executive administrations 
hinges on their initial treatment by the current administration.  However, 
President Correa’s recent behavior contradicts his supposed good intentions 
and implies that he lacks a sincere intention to implement the amendments.22 
A. Correa Has a Track Record of Choosing Profit Over Pachamama  
 How will President Correa implement his many promises and 
simultaneously keep the country economically afloat?  Although President 
Correa has expressed support for the indigenous plaintiffs suing Texaco over 
environment concerns,23 his actions in other arenas have been inconsistent 
with the amendments, earning him a reputation as an “ambivalent 
                                           
18
 Schweimler, supra note 16; Romero, supra note 16. 
19
 Agustín Grijalva, Courts and Political Parties: The Politics of Constitutional Review in Ecuador 
150 (2010) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pittsburgh). 
20
 Catherine Conaghan & Carlos de la Torre, The Permanent Campaign of Rafael Correa: Making 
Ecuador’s Plebiscitary Presidency, 13(3) PRESS/POLITICS 272, 278 (2008). 
21
 The 2008 Constitution is Ecuador’s twentieth.  Jose Luis Cordeiro, Latin America: Constitution 
Crazy, LATIN BUSINESS CHRONICLE (Oct. 6, 2008), 
http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com/app/article.aspx?id=2799.   
22
 See infra Part II.B.1-2.   
23
 Nikolas Kozloff, Ecuador’s Rafael Correa: Copenhagen Climate Hero or Environmental Foe?, 
http://www.sosyasuni.org/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=137&catid=1&Itemid=34. 
JUNE 2011 ENFORCING NATURE’S RIGHTS UNDER ECUADOR’S CONSTITUTION 663 
  
environmentalist.”24  President Correa has tough choices to make, 
considering Ecuador’s economy survives mainly off its extractive industries.  
In 2008, oil and mining comprised 26.8%—by far the biggest chunk—of 
Ecuador’s GDP,25 so approximately one-third of Ecuador’s spending budget 
comes from petroleum products.26  The country needs this income: almost 
half its population lives below the poverty line.27  President Correa seems to 
approach the role of extractive industries in the national economy with 
pragmatism.  In a 2009 radio address, he commented, “It is absurd that some 
want to force us to remain like beggars sitting atop a bag of gold.”28   
However, the same industries bringing Ecuador profit are also 
polluting it—a situation that now violates the Constitution.  Even some 
environmentalists doubt the amendments can survive those economic 
realities.29  This basic conflict begs the question of whether nature can truly 
have rights in a country whose economy survives on nature’s exploitation. 
1. Correa’s Troubling Reaction to Constitutional Challenges to Mining 
Foreshadows His Reaction to Constitutional Challenges Under the 
New Environmental Amendments 
  President Correa’s reaction to a conflict between the interests of the 
country’s mining industry30 and the constitutional “right to water” provides 
an example of his duplicity.31  In January 2009, President Correa 
backpedaled on the new “right to water” language by passing a new mining 
law that opened up the country to large-scale metal mining by foreign 
companies.32  The mining threatens indigenous water supplies and the “right 
to water” held by indigenous communities who cannot survive without clean 
                                           
24
 Id. 
25
 Background Note: Ecuador, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE: BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS 
(May 24, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35761.htm . 
26
 Kozloff, supra note 23. 
27
 The Associated Press, supra note 3. 
28
 Daniel Denvir, Resource Wars in Ecuador: Indigenous People Accuse President Rafael Correa of 
Selling out to Mining Interests, IN THESE TIMES (Feb. 28, 2009), 
http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/4252/resource_wars_in_ecuador/. 
29
 One commented, “It sounds great, but in practice, governments like Correa’s will argue that 
funding his political project, which will bring ‘well being and relieve poverty,’ overrules the rights of 
nature because the best technology will be used and mining and other extractive industries will be, of 
course, sustainable.”  Cyril Mychalejko, Ecuador’s Constitution Gives Rights to Nature, PHILADELPHIA 
INDEP. MEDIA CENTER (Sept. 28, 2008), http://www.phillyimc.org/en/node/75055.   
30
 Oil and mining activities comprise 26.8% of Ecuador’s gross domestic product. U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, supra note 25.   
31
 CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 66. 
32
 Paul Dosh & Nicole Kligerman, Correa vs. Social Movements: Showdown in Ecuador, 42 N. 
AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA 5 (Sept./Oct. 2009), available at  https://nacla.org/node/6094.   
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water.33  Indigenous campesinos (peasant farmers) and groups like the 
Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities of Ecuador (“CONAIE”34) are 
outraged at Correa’s duplicity.  Tens of thousands protested the passage of 
the mining law.35  
2. President Correa’s Anti-NGO Response to the Protests Raises Doubt 
as to the Sincerity of His Intention to Implement Nature’s Rights 
President Correa’s response to the protests did nothing to dissipate the 
conclusion that the new constitutional provisions are insincere or to narrow 
the growing rift between the government, who initially supported the new 
constitution, and social movements.36  Ignoring the protestors’ argument that 
the mining violates the new constitution, President Correa pointed fingers at 
the protestors, calling them “nobodies” and “extremists.”37  He also shut 
down several organizations that participated in the protests.  First, President 
Correa moved to close down the Development Council of the Indigenous 
Nationalities and Peoples of Ecuador (“CODENPE”), claiming its executive 
secretary was misappropriating funds to her home province.38  Next, 
President Correa undermined the National Directorate of Intercultural 
Bilingual Education (“DINEIB”), which supported the anti-mining 
movement by placing it under control of the Ministry of Education.39  The 
proximity of these actions to the protests (one to two months) renders 
President Correa’s motivations extremely suspect.40   
President Correa’s administration also garnered international criticism 
by shutting down Acción Ecológíca (“AE”),41 a leading non-governmental 
organization (“NGO”) and one of Latin America’s best-known 
                                           
33
 Raúl Zibechi, Ecuador: The Logic of Development Clashes with Movements, AMERICAS PROGRAM 
(March 17, 2009), http://upsidedownworld.org/main/ecuador-archives-49/1772-ecuador-the-logic-of-
development-clashes-with-movements. 
34
 CONAIE is one of Latin America’s most powerful indigenous groups.  Robert Andolina, The 
Sovereign and Its Shadow: Constituent Assembly and Indigenous Movement in Ecuador, 4 J. LAT. AMER. 
STUD. 35, 721–750 (2003), available at http://journals.cambridge.org.   
35
 Zibechi, supra note 33; see also Kozloff, supra note 23; Dosh & Kligerman, supra note 32.  
36
 These movements are now “increasingly disillusioned with the possibility that Correa represents a 
continuation of neoliberal policy,” which President Correa’s campaign specifically promised to avoid.  
Dosh & Kligerman, supra note 32. 
37
 Denvir, supra note 28; see also Kenneth P. Jameson, The Indigenous Movement and the Economic 
Trajectory of Ecuador 23 (Univ. of Utah Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 2008-05), available at 
http://www.econ.utah.edu/activities/papers/2008_05.pdf (“…There have already been areas where the 
Correa administration and Pachakutik have been at odds.”). 
38
 Dosh & Kligerman, supra note 32.  
39
 Id.   
40
 See generally Denvir, supra note 28.  
41
 “Environmental Action” is an NGO that since the 1980s has protested exploitation of oil, water, 
and precious metals in Ecuador, as well as pollution and deforestation.  Dosh & Kligerman, supra note 32. 
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environmental groups,42 which supported the mining protests.43  The 
government’s reasons for revoking AE’s legal status are still unclear:  
initially, Ecuador’s Health Minister claimed that AE failed to fulfill its NGO 
charter, but she later changed her story, saying that Ecuador simply wanted 
to move AE’s registration to the new Ministry of Environment, which did 
not exist when AE was founded.44  However, AE was given no advance 
notice before being shut down, making it hard for most activists to believe 
this was merely administrative streamlining.45 Whatever President Correa’s 
real reasons, the revocation of AE’s legal status undermines confidence in 
his intentions to implement the new environmental provisions, as shutting 
down Latin America’s leading environmental organization is a move that is 
fundamentally at odds with improving environmental protection.  In sum, 
friction over the mining law illuminates a critical limitation in the new 
environmental provisions:  they conflict with President Correa’s other 
political and economic priorities. 
III. PROCEDURAL CONFUSION, TEXTUAL VAGUENESS, AND THE CHAOTIC 
HISTORY OF ECUADOR’S CONSTITUTIONAL TRIBUNAL WILL HINDER 
IMPLEMENTATION  
Numerous legal barriers impede Ecuador’s implementation of its 
environmental amendments.  First, Ecuador lacks a clear standing doctrine.  
It is unclear who may bring an action on its behalf, and what he or she must 
prove to gain standing.46  This lack of a clear standing doctrine creates 
fundamental uncertainty about the justiciability of claims under the 
amendments.47  Second, the amendments are textually vague and 
                                           
42
 Daniel Denvir, Injustice in Ecuador: Ecuadorean Government Shuts Down Leading 
Environmental Group, MANGROVE ACTION PROJECT (Mar. 16, 2009), 
http://mangroveactionproject.org/news/current_headlines/injustice-in-ecuador-ecuadorian-government-
shuts-down-leading-environmental-group/. 
43
 AE leader Ivonne Ramos released a statement calling the administrations’ actions arbitrary 
censorship and likening them to an episode of authoritarianism “that is intolerable in a democratic regime.” 
Denvir, supra note 42.  Canadian author and activist Naomi Klein wrote an open letter to President Correa, 
saying his actions resembled “something all too familiar: a state seemingly using its power to weaken 
dissent.”  Dosh & Kligerman, supra note 32.  
44
 Denvir, supra note 42. 
45
 Id.   
46
 Michelle P. Bassi, La Naturalez O Pacha Mama De Ecuador: What Doctrine Should Grant Trees 
Standing, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 461, 464 (2009) (“Ecuador’s constitution is unclear about the requirements 
for standing, and in fact, standing to enforce nature’s rights appears to be merely a constitutional 
directive.”). 
47
 The exact concept of standing varies by country.  See Angel R. Oquendo, The Solitude of Latin 
America: The Struggle for Rights South of the Border, 43 TEX. INT’L L.J. 185, 217-218 (2008) (providing 
general background on the different approaches to standing taken by different Latin American countries). 
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inconsistent with other provisions.  Finally, Ecuador’s constitutional court 
has been politically comprised for decades;48 this judicial corruption will be 
a hurdle to enforcement of the new provisions—even though the 2008 
amendments aim to reverse these patterns. 
A. Ecuador’s Lack of a Useable Standing Doctrine Impedes 
Implementation and Litigation of the Amendments 
 The procedural questions the amendments raise are not particularly 
new—and neither is the idea that the environment should possess its own 
rights.49  In 1972, Professor Christopher Stone published what has become 
an iconic article, positing that nature should have standing in court.50  Nearly 
forty years later, Stone’s article is now a book,51 and Ecuador is the first 
country to try to prove his thesis workable.  But procedural ambiguity stands 
in the way of completely granting legal status to the environment.  In this 
way, Ecuador demonstrates what renowned environmentalist and law 
professor Joseph Sax mused in 1971:  “An essential question that must be 
asked whenever proposals for an environmental declaration of rights are 
raised, is whether those rights are going to be enforceable, and if so, by 
whom.”52  In short, Ecuador’s standing doctrine—or lack thereof—is a 
fundamental barrier to the enforceability of the amendments.   
Ecuador’s Constitution and statutory law fail to clearly articulate its 
standing doctrine.53  The absence of criteria for who may sue on the 
environment’s behalf creates fundamental uncertainty about the justiciability 
of claims under the amendments—and indicates doubt as to the 
Constitution’s ability to serve as a source of real rights and remedies.  
Currently, a citizen can have no idea how to establish him or herself as the 
proper voice to sue on the environment’s behalf.  This uncertainty critically 
impairs citizens’ ability to sue for enforcement of the new provisions.  
Consider an example:  a multinational oil company has polluted an 
Ecuadorean neighborhood’s water source.  Outraged citizens prepare to sue 
                                           
48
 See infra Part III.C.1. 
49
 See, e.g., RODERICK FRAZIER NASH, THE RIGHTS OF NATURE: A HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
ETHICS (1989).  
50
 See generally Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL L. REV. 450 (1972).  Standing “is the authority of someone to initiate an 
action.”  STONE, supra note 8, at 35.   
51
 STONE, supra note 8.   
52
 JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT: A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION 235 (1971).   
53
 Bassi, supra note 46, at 463 (“In a civil law legal system, where case law and judicial 
interpretation do not create precedence, the standing doctrine is susceptible to changes through ensuing 
legislation . . . Ecuador’s constitutional standing for the environment has yet to be codified or 
litigated . . . .).   
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for an injunction to enforce nature’s constitutional right to “persist and 
exist.”54  How do they proceed?   
The plaintiffs would first have to file an acción de amparo, a citizen’s 
remedy expressly created by Ecuador’s Constitution55 for the judicial 
protection of constitutional rights.56  The question of the proper plaintiff 
under the new environmental provisions is a tricky one, because the plaintiff 
in an amparo “must be precisely the injured or aggrieved person.”57  In other 
words, the new Article 71 grants rights to nature, but trees, streams, and 
animals cannot hire lawyers, appear in court, pay court fees, or collect 
damages.  The courtroom advocate must be a human, and that human must 
have standing to bring the environmental claim. 
Standing is a threshold issue in the adjudication of any constitutional 
right.  Hence, Ecuadorean plaintiffs suing to enforce nature’s rights under 
the new environmental amendments must first know and meet the standing 
requirements before they can get in the courtroom.58  Proof of standing in the 
United States is usually difficult to achieve in environmental litigation 
because it is often difficult to demonstrate the direct harm U.S. courts 
require.59  
Ecuador’s standing doctrine is a far cry from the enumerated standing 
requirements under Article II of the United States Constitution.60  Because 
Ecuador’s standing doctrine is not well developed,61 plaintiffs in Ecuador do 
not know what they must show.  The Ecuadorean amendments try and fail to 
clarify standing, but to that end they only vaguely grant legal standing to 
persons defending nature’s rights.62  This sweeping language does nothing to 
clarify the requirements.  What we do know is that in most cases, only the 
                                           
54
 CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71. 
55
 Id. at art. 88 
56
 See ALLAN R. BREWER-CARIAS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN 
AMERICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF AMPARO PROCEEDINGS 153 (2009).  
57
 Id. at 181.  
58
 Id. at 181-83.   
59
 See Joshua J. Bruckerhoff, Note, Giving Nature Constitutional Protection: A Less Anthropocentric 
Interpretation of Environmental Rights, 86 TEX. L. REV. 615, 628 (2008).   
60
 In the United States, a plaintiff earns standing in federal court by showing “that (1) through breach 
of a duty owed by defendant to it; (2) a plaintiff has suffered an ‘injury in fact’ that is a legally recognized 
harm that is both (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not “conjectural” or 
“hypothetical”’; (3) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant (‘causation’); (4) 
it has to be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision (‘redressability’).” STONE, supra note 8, at 36 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. 
Systems (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000)).  Precise standing requirements often vary by statute.   
61
 Bassi, supra note 46, at 465 (“ . . . nature’s rights will be substantively litigated only after Ecuador 
determines the contours of their standing doctrine . . . ”). 
62
 CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71.   
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injured party has standing to file the amparo,63 but the Constitution 
nevertheless allows for the possibility for other persons to sue on the injured 
party’s behalf in some cases. 64  This is of course the format that suits 
brought under the new environmental provisions will require; since nature 
cannot sue on its own behalf, humans must do it.   
A crucial problem with humans acting as nature’s courtroom 
representative is that Ecuador’s new Constitution omits any criteria as to 
which of nature’s millions of potential representatives can earn standing.   
The text merely states that “each person, community, neighborhood and 
nationality shall have the power to enforce the rights before the public 
authority.”65  Even accepting for a moment that any person really can bring 
an amparo to enforce nature’s rights, plaintiffs still face the procedural 
problem of knowing what they must prove in order to earn standing.  Thus, 
plaintiffs must litigate at the whim of judges with diverse environmental 
viewpoints, who could toss their case for lack of standing at any point in the 
litigation since the doctrine is undefined.66  Consequently, the mandate 
granting rights to nature “appears to be merely a constitutional directive” 
that is not self-executing.67  Until Ecuador clarifies the standing criteria, 
plaintiffs will not be able to effectively sue, and nature’s new “rights” will 
remain unenforceable.68  
Countless other procedural questions remain unanswered.  For 
instance, the text provides no guidance as to which tribunal will handle the 
environmental claims except to say that the “public authorities” can be 
called upon to enforce nature’s rights.69  If the court awards damages, how is 
the money judgment to be executed and to whom is it payable?  Who will 
pay for the legal representation and court fees?  What are the contours of the 
causation requirement for showing the root of the environmental damage at 
issue?70  The new Constitution provides no answers, and these questions are 
                                           
63
 See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 56, at 183 n.328.   
64
 Id. at 186 n. 339.  
65
 CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71 (“toda persona, comunidad, pueblo o nacionalidad 
podrá exigir a la autoridad pública el cumplimiento de los derechos de la naturaleza”) (translation by 
author). 
66
 See Bassi, supra note 46, at 465.  
67
 For a constitutional right to be enforceable, it must be either self-executing or the legislature must 
directly enact legislation for its enforcement.  See Bruckerhoff, supra note 59, at 627.  A provision is self-
executing if it is directly enforceable without supplemental legislation.  See Neil A.F. Popovic, Pursuing 
Environmental Justice with International Human Rights and State Constitutions, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 
338, 358 (1996). 
68
 Bassi, supra note 46, at 464. 
69
 CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71.   
70
 The causation requirement becomes especially tricky when the claim concerns climate change, as 
these claims create “daunting problems of proof.”  STONE, supra note 8, at 50.   
JUNE 2011 ENFORCING NATURE’S RIGHTS UNDER ECUADOR’S CONSTITUTION 669 
  
beyond the scope of this article.  Nevertheless, this lack of procedural clarity 
renders the new rights meaningless until procedural criteria are clarified.  
Without legislation or further clarification of Ecuador’s standing doctrine, 
these constitutional “rights” will only exist in theory. 
B. Textual Vagueness and Internal Inconsistencies: What is “Nature,” 
and What Happens When Rights Conflict? 
Latin American Constitutions generally tend to be comprehensive and 
use broad language, thus lending themselves to internal contradictions.71  
This generality holds true for Ecuador in this instance, as its new 
amendments conflict with other provisions of the Constitution.72  In addition 
to a lack of procedural clarity, the new environmental amendments are also 
textually vague.  For one, the provisions define neither the entities they 
purport to protect nor the extent of the protection.73  The text uses the terms 
“la naturaleza” (nature) and “la Pacha Mama” (Mother Earth).74  These two 
extremely broad concepts are likely to confuse courts and litigants alike, 
especially since Ecuador has failed to define (or codify) their breadth. What 
is a litigant to think?   
An environmental litigant preparing to bring an amparo under the new 
provisions could move to protect anything arguably characterized as 
nature.75  In other words, one might presume that the drafters meant to 
protect the colloquial aspects of nature that first spring to mind for many, 
such as animals, plants and bodies of water.  But these storybook images are 
not the extent of nature.  Literally and scientifically, the environment 
includes less endearing entities like pests, viruses, bacteria, tornadoes, and 
intangible entities like climate.76  Thus, the new Constitution, read literally, 
grants all of these entities equal rights to “restoration,” as well as the right to 
exist and regenerate.77   
This broad grant of protection is impractical and destined to create 
bizarre conflicts where natural ecological relationships become litigation 
fodder.  In the natural environment, organisms fight others for survival.  
                                           
71
 Patricio Navia and Julio Ríos-Figueroa, The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic of Latin America, 
38 COMPARATIVE POL. STUDIES 189, 193 (2005).   
72
 Compare CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71-74 with art. 12 and with art. 57.   
73
 Id. at art. 71-74. 
74
 Id.  
75
 The “environment” is defined as “the complex of physical, chemical, and biotic factors (as 
climate, soil, and living things) that act upon an organism or an ecological community and ultimately 
determinate its form and survival.”  MERRIAM WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 188 (10th ed. 1995).  
76
 Id.  
77
 CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71-72. 
670 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 20 NO. 3 
 
 
Does Ecuador’s new Constitution mean that these competitors could wind 
up in its courts?  Consider what would happen if pests devoured an entire 
crop of bananas.  Bananas are a cash crop in Ecuador,78 so could one assume 
their rights would trump those of the pests?  The text provides no such rule.  
Perhaps the drafters intentionally left these determinations to the courts, but 
such determinations would be a blatant waste of time and resources for 
Ecuador’s judiciary, which is notoriously inefficient as it is.79  In sum, 
bizarre conflicts of interest could wind up in Ecuador’s tribunals without 
further clarification of just what the drafters meant by “nature.”  Until this 
clarification occurs, the provision cannot achieve the drafters’ aims, and 
environmental plaintiffs cannot act on nature’s “rights.”  
The potential for internal conflict extends beyond the animal 
kingdom:  what happens when nature’s constitutional rights conflict with 
humans’ constitutional rights?  Consider again the scenario of the pests 
destroying the bananas.  If the banana farmer destroys the pests, he would be 
in violation of the constitution for denying the pest its Article 71 right to 
exist.80  However, the farmer could argue that under Article 12, all 
Ecuadoreans have the constitutional right to “safe, permanent access to 
healthy, adequate and nutritional food, preferably produced locally and in 
keeping with their cultural identities and traditions.”81  Assuming for the 
sake of the exercise that bananas satisfy the local, healthy and traditional 
criteria, what could result under the new Constitution?  The lack of clarity 
regarding the hierarchy of rights the drafters intended is currently a blockade 
to effective litigation of nature’s rights.  The Constitution provides no 
answer as to whether human rights trump nature’s rights.82  Without this 
clarity, Article 71’s grant of rights to the environment will have no bite in 
court. 
                                           
78
 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, supra note 30. 
79
 Kenneth W. Dam, The Judiciary and Economic Development 11 (The Chicago Working Paper 
Series, John M. Olin Law & Economics, Working Paper, No. 287, 2006), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html and http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=892030. 
80
 CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 71. 
81
 Id. at art. 13. 
82
 Additionally, the new constitution grants indigenous communities several rights that potentially 
conflict with the environment’s Article 71 rights.  For example, Article 57 grants indigenous peoples the 
right to manage their community lands.  CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 57.  Management is left 
undefined, and thus could mean, in some cases, partial destruction, as communities need raw materials for 
shelter and plants and animals for consumption.  As with the banana scenario, this indigenous activity 
would technically impinge on nature’s Article 71 rights.  And as with those scenarios, the constitutional 
text provides no insight as to the priority such rights should take. 
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C. A Long History of Corruption in Ecuador’s Constitutional Court Will 
Be a Hurdle for Environmental Plaintiffs, but President Correa’s New 
Court Could Potentially Reverse These Patterns 
In addition to textual and procedural vagueness, Ecuador’s judicial 
dysfunction poses another challenge to enforcement of the new 
constitutional provisions.83  As positive as the new provisions seem, they can 
only have practical bite if Ecuador’s tribunals possess legitimate power to 
rule on claims brought under them.  As one scholar summarized, “A sound 
judiciary is the key to enforcement… no degree of improvement in 
substantive law…will bring the rule of law to a country that does not have 
effective enforcement.”84  Effective enforcement is critical for environmental 
plaintiffs because plaintiffs in Ecuador are barred from bringing an amparo 
action against judicial decisions.85  The court’s decision, whether right or 
wrong, is the end of the road—a scary reality considering the amount of 
political entrenchment present in the court’s past decisions.86 
The history of Ecuador’s constitutional court shows that effective 
enforcement of constitutional rights was virtually impossible until very 
recently.87  A historical account demonstrates the chaos and political 
manipulation that has pervaded Ecuador’s constitutional court (“CC”).88  Its 
long history of abuse by the executive and legislative branches will be a 
hurdle to the enforcement of these new environmental provisions—even 
though the 2008 amendments aim to reverse these patterns.  
 
1.  Institutionalized Corruption in Ecuador’s Constitutional Court Will 
Likely Forestall Meaningful Litigation of Environmental Claims 
 
 Ecuador’s new Constitutional amendments carry with them a legacy 
of corruption and chaos that began in the nineteenth century.  An overview 
of this history illuminates the fragility of new Constitutional provisions and 
the tendency of the government to ignore the Constitution altogether. 
Because of this lack of judicial independence, environmental plaintiffs 
should expect that resolution of their claims will turn on politics, not merit. 89  
                                           
83
 See generally Grijalva, supra note 19. 
84
 Dam, supra note 79, at 1.  
85
 See BREWER-CARIAS, supra note 56, at 323-24 (citing PESANTES, supra note 63, at 84).  
86
 See Part II.C.1. 
87
 See generally Grijalva, supra note 19. 
88
 Id.   
89
 TGC case law shows that Ecuador’s constitutional court lacked judicial independence until 2007 
(and even after the recent amendments, independence is far from certain).  A 2001 economic policy case 
regarding a value added tax (“VAT case”) proposal reveals that TGC judges often voted blindly along party 
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 Until 1945, Ecuadorean citizens had no action, institution or 
mechanism to bring a claim that a law violated the Constitution.90  No 
separate constitutional court existed as it does now; Ecuador’s Congress 
itself conducted constitutional review.91  The 1906 Constitution even 
formalized that only Congress could declare a law unconstitutional.92  
Finally, in 1945, the Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees (“TGC”) was 
formed.93  The TGC was a Constitutional tribunal outside the judiciary, and 
thus a completely separate court from Ecuador’s Supreme Court.94  The 
TGC’s power was limited.  It could review Congressional proposals a priori 
but Congress had the final word on a law’s constitutionality.95  Thus, the 
TGC’s authority was limited to making observations about constitutionality 
and suspending the law until Congress could decide the issue.96   Real power 
to render binding decisions remained with Congress, and the Court 
functioned more as an “administrative court that exercised control over the 
executive [branch rather] than a court [that performed] constitutional review 
                                                                                                                              
lines, and not by the merits.  TC ruling 126-2001-TP; Grijalva, supra note 19, at 119.  In 2001, President 
Gustavo Noboa proposed a tax reform that, among other things, would have increased the value added tax 
(“VAT”) from twelve to fifteen percent. Id. at 118. The proposal received vehement opposition in Congress 
from parties on both the right and left. Id. The proposal went to Congress in March 2001, and when 
Congress overturned it, Noboa vetoed Congress’s decision, edited the proposal, and sent it back proposing 
a smaller increase. Id. This time, Congress failed to reach the two-third majority that the Constitution 
required to override a presidential veto. CONST. ECUADOR (1998), art. 153, available at 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/ecuador98.html [hereinafter CONST. ECUADOR (1998)]; 
Grijalva, supra note 19, at 119. The president’s proposal therefore became law after thirty days, as the 
Constitution required.  CONST. ECUADOR (1998), supra note 89, at art. 155, 156; Grijalva, supra note 19, at 
119.  The opposition challenged the proposal’s constitutionality before the TGC, which held the VAT 
increase unconstitutional in a five-four decision.  Grijalva, supra note 19, at 120.  The TC made the wrong 
decision, as Ecuador’s Congress never reached a two-thirds majority required to override the presidential 
veto. Significantly, every TGC member in the majority was publicly linked to parties who opposed 
Noboa’s administration and the VAT. Id. The dissenting TGC members were all publicly linked to pro-
government parties.  The court’s vote did not follow ideological lines: if it had, the members linked to the 
ID and PSE who voted with the majority would have instead voted with the dissent (which would then have 
been the majority), because those parties sit left of center on the political spectrum and tend to favor tax 
hikes for “social redistributive purposes.”  Id.  This outcome proves that partisan loyalties dictated a critical 
constitutional ruling.  Indeed, the majority gained a definitive advantage in voting with Congress and 
against the president: they avoided impeachment by the legislature.  Id. at 122. 
90
 Grijalva, supra note 19, at 28.  
91
 Id.   
92
 CONSTITUTION OF  ECUADOR  (1906) Provisions 6 & 7, available at 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/constitucion-de-1906-del-ecuador.  These provisions were reiterated 
in all Ecuadorean Constitutions until the 1992 reform.  Grijalva, supra note 19, at 28. 
93
 The TGC’s name changed to the Constitutional Tribunal (Tribunal Constitutionál) (“TC”) in 
2006.  Grijalva, supra note 19, at 20.  
94
 The TC’s independence from the Court is a strength of Ecuador’s judiciary. Navia & Ríos-
Figueroa, supra note 71, at 196-97. 
95
 Grijalva, supra note 19, at 33.  
96
 Id. at 30, 42 n.28.   
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of legislation enacted by Congress.”97 
Despite several amendments between 1946 and 1992, the Court’s 
power and existence remained under the thumb of Congress and the 
President.98 Just one year after the TGC’s founding, the President discarded 
the 1945 Constitution and wrote a new one that did not include the TGC— 
simply because he was unhappy with the restraints the TGC imposed on the 
executive branch.99  Just like that, the Court was gone, and Congress—the 
branch that passed the laws—was put in charge of deciding whether laws 
violated the constitution.100  The 1967 amendments resurrected the TGC, but 
its power was still limited to formulating observations about the 
constitutionality of laws and decrees.101  The Court’s decisional 
independence from other branches of government withered away:  it became 
merely an “‘extended sub-committee’ of Congress.”102  In 1983, the TGC 
finally received the power to suspend unconstitutional laws,103 but even as 
late as 1992, Congress retained general power to determine the meaning of 
unconstitutional provisions104 (which is, paradoxically, a power necessary 
for the TGC to perform constitutional review).  This lack of judicial 
independence begs the conclusion that environmental rights105 stood little 
chance of enforcement under these past constitutions.   
Progress seemed to arrive in 1996, when the TGC became the 
Tribunal Constitutional (“TC”), and the Court earned the power “of final say 
for constitutional review.”106  The Court now had power to rule with finality 
on constitutional rights, although formally, Congress remained the “ultimate 
interpreter of the constitution.”107  Until these reforms, a citizen’s only 
recourse for constitutional violations was a claim (queja) over which the 
TGC could merely “make observations.”108  The 1996 Constitution also 
created the writ of amparo, an individual “legal action to immediately 
                                           
97
 Id. at 27. 
98
 Id. at 32, 33, 39, 42.  
99
 Id. at 32.   
100
 Id. at 33.  
101
 Grijalva, supra note 19, at 33. 
102
 Id. at 39. 
103
 Id.   
104
 CONSTITUTION OF ECUADOR (1978), Provisions 141-42, available at 
http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/constitucion-de-1978-del-ecuador-codificada-en-1984; Grijalva, 
supra note 19, at 39, n. 26. 
105
 At this point, constitutional environmental rights did not extend to the environment itself; rather, 
humans enjoyed the right to a “healthy environment.”  See Erin Daly & James R. May, Vindicating 
Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide, 11 ORE. REV. INTL. L. 265, 395 (2009). 
106
 Grijalva, supra note 19, at 42. 
107
 Id. 
108
 Id at 42 n. 28. 
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suspend authorities’ actions when a constitution right is being violated.”109 
Things were improving.  These reforms changed the way a citizen could 
request constitutional review by the Court.  Under Provision 277, groups of 
at least one thousand citizens could request constitutional review.110  An 
individual citizen could also challenge a law, but the Constitution required 
him to first obtain a positive opinion declaration111 from an Ombudsman112 
before he could take his case before the TC.113  Furthermore, the 1998 
reforms continued to expand the TC’s power by requiring the legislature to 
follow mandatory impeachment procedures before removing TC members 
from the court.114  Together, the 1996 and 1998 reforms gave the Court “a 
wider set of tools [for] constitutional control.”115  It seemed that Ecuador had 
finally created an independent constitutional judiciary, as TC decisions were 
final and Congress had no right to review them.116  Under this scheme, 
environmental claims would seem to stand a chance of fair adjudication. 
In reality, however, political manipulation of the TC continued even 
after the 1996 and 1998 reforms.  After 1997, Ecuador’s political scene was 
“characterized by almost continuous presidential crisis.”117  As a result of the 
chaos, the TC became “a sort of additional legislative arena,” and, “political 
parties permanently looked for influence or control over TC judges.”118  
Between 1996 and 2007, no TC or individual Justice completed the 
constitutionally mandated four-year term.119  The inter-branch tension was 
such that three Presidents were unconstitutionally removed from office 
between 1997 and 2005,120 and five constitutional tribunals were 
unconstitutionally removed. 121  After one such removal, new TC members 
                                           
109
 Id. 
110
 CONST. ECUADOR (1998), supra note 89, Art. 277; Grijalva, supra note 19, at 66. 
111
 A “positive opinion” is one where the Ombudsman found the challenge adequate in that it 
established at least the formal requirements.  This opinion could contain information about the plaintiff and 
the law or norm that the plaintiff was challenging. Grijalva, supra note 19, at 66, 88.  
112
 In Ecuador, as in many other Latin American countries, the Ombudsman functions independently 
from the government and represents citizen rights, not government interests.  Grijalva, supra note 19, at 88. 
While the Attorney General represents the interests of the government, the Ombudsman possesses the 
political power to both denounce human rights violations and initiate legal actions, like amparo and habeas 
corpus, before the Supreme Court or TC.  Id. at 72. 
113
 CONST. ECUADOR (1998), supra note 89, at art. 277; Grijalva, supra note 19, at 66. 
114
 Grijalva, supra note 19, at 48.  
115
 Id. at 47. 
116
 Id. at 48. 
117
 Id. at 49 
118
 Id. 
119
 Santiago Basabe-Serrano & John Polga-Hecimovich, Legislative Coalitions and Judicial Turnover 
in Ecuador’s Constitutional Court (1999-2007), www.flacso.org.ec/docs/doctrabpp_basabe3.pdf. 
120
 Conaghan, supra note 20, at 271. 
121
 Grijalva, supra note 19, at 25, 36, 49, 51 (t. 2-4).  
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were not appointed for eleven months, during which time the court simply 
ceased to function.122   
In sum, chaos and fragmentation characterized Ecuador’s 
constitutional court until just four years ago when President Rafael Correa 
took office in January 2007 as Ecuador’s eighth president in ten years.123   
Infrastructural problems have made the TC “vulnerable and unstable,”124 
rendering it utterly unreliable for plaintiffs with constitutional grievances. 
These factors have eroded judicial independence in Ecuador during this 
period.125  The Court’s inconsistent existence and powers of constitutional 
review suggest that the environmental rights provisions introduced in 
Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution would stand little chance of meaningful 
enforcement in this judicial scheme.  What should have been Ecuador’s most 
competent constitutional court became ensnared in conflicts with the 
executive and legislative branches.126  The TC lacked legitimate authority to 
make binding constitutional rulings, and judges were political marionettes.127 
During this period of turmoil, plaintiffs could not rely on the court’s 
existence or independence—let alone its power to issue a binding judgment 
safe from Congress’s reversal.128  This account serves as a caution to 
environmental plaintiffs that their claims in all likelihood would turn more 
on political loyalties than legal merit.129 
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 Id.  at 60. 
123
 Id. at 49; Romero, supra note 18; Schweimler, supra note 16.  
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 Grijalva, supra note 19, at 44. 
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 Id. at 61. 
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 Conaghan, supra note 20, at 271; Grijalva, supra note 19, at 25, 36, 49, 51 (t. 2-4). 
127
 Appointments of TC members “served as patronage to be distributed among the government’s 
new allies in exchange for congressional support to avoid impeachments, passing legislation or 
implementing policy.” Grijalva, supra note 19, at 26. Studies demonstrate that between 1979 and 1998 
judicial posts served as “discretionary collation payoffs available to Ecuadorean Presidents.” Id. at 63. 
128
 CONST. ECUADOR (1906), supra note 92; Grijalva, supra note 19, at 27, 30, 32, 33, 39 n.26, 42 
n.28. 
129
 Two TGC decisions cut against the argument that the TGC lacked the ability to fairly adjudicate 
environmental claims during this period.  In Fundación Natura v. Petro Ecuador, the Court relied on 
Ecuadoreans’ right to a healthy environment in upholding a civil verdict that Petro Ecuador’s production of 
leaded fuel violated Ecuador’s federal law.  See May & Daly, supra note 105, at 395 (citing Case Nos. 
377/90, 378/90, 379/90, 380/90 combined, Fundacion Natura v. Petro Ecuador, Tribunal of Constitutional 
Guarantees, Resolution No. 230-92-CP, Oct. 15, 1992 (Ecuador)).  In Arco Iris v. Instituto Ecuatoriano de 
Mineria, the TGC examined environmental degradation occurring in Podocarpus National Park in Southern 
Ecuador.  The court concluded that the company’s mining and road building operations in the park were “a 
threat to the environmental human right of the inhabitants of the provinces of Loja and Zamora Chinchipe 
to have an area which ensures the natural and continuous provision of water, air humidity, oxygenation and 
recreation.”  See May and Daly, supra note 105, at 395 (citing Case No. 224/90, Arco Iris v. Instituto 
Ecuatoriano de Mineria, Tribunal of Constitutional Guarantees, Judgment No. 054-93-CP, translated from 
Environmental Law Institute, U.N. Env’t Program [UNEP], Constitutional Environmental Law: Giving 
Force to Fundamental Principles in Africa 26 (2007)).  These cases were environmental victories, and thus 
seem to undermine the conclusion that the court lacked independence during this period.  However, it is 
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1. Under the Correa Administration, Environmental Claims May Now 
Stand a Chance of Fair Adjudication 
 Despite the past dysfunction in Ecuador’s judiciary, a strong argument 
exists that President Correa’s changes would force Ecuador’s constitutional 
tribunal to function more independently from the other branches of 
government.130  If this happens, environmental claims brought under the new 
amendments would receive fairer adjudication than they would have under 
previous reforms.  The 2008 Constitution significantly changed the format of 
constitutional adjudication in Ecuador,131 and may increase the chances that 
Ecuador’s courts will be able to meaningfully enforce the new 
environmental mandates.  Others argue that the changes make Ecuador’s 
constitutional tribunal more dependent on the President132—and thus 
represent no real improvement. 
Structural changes to the Court seem to improve access to justice.  
The 2008 Constitution, which replaced the TC with the Constitutional Court 
(“CC”),133 allows ordinary citizens to file cases directly with the court 
(instead of relying on the Ombudsman’s134 approval, as required in the 
past).135  A third of the CC will be replaced every three years,136 and 
appointments are now merit-based.137  The CC enjoys more power and 
independence than the Court ever did in the past  it is finally “completely 
clear” that the CC is “the only final interpreter of the constitution, and this 
interpretation cannot be overruled by the legislature.”138  Therefore judicial 
independence is more plausible under the 2008 reforms than under past 
                                                                                                                              
unclear whether the court would come out the same way as it did in Arco Iris when faced with a suit that 
did not concern federally protected parkland. 
130
 See Roque Planas, Ecuador Divided Over Correa’s Referendum, AMERICAS SOCIETY/COUNCIL OF 
THE AMERICAS (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.as-
coa.org/articles/3040/Ecuador_Divided_over_Correas_Referendum/ (discussing a referendum proposed by 
Correa that would help combat corruption in the judiciary). 
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 Grijalva, supra note 19, at 158. 
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 Id. 
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 CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 429-440. 
134
 In Ecuador, as in many Latin American countries, the Ombudsman functions independently from 
the government and represents citizen rights, not government interests.  Grijalva, supra note 19, at 88.  
While the Attorney General represents the interests of the government, the Ombudsman possesses the 
political power to both denounce human rights violation and initiate legal actions, like amparo and habeas 
corpus.  Id. at 72.  
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Report: Ecuador (Mar. 11, 2010), http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/wha/136111.htm (last visited 
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 CONST. ECUADOR, supra note 5, at art. 432.  
137
 Grijalva, supra note 19, at 158.  Critics of this new format, however, note that the new 
appointment procedure for the CC allows the government to easily appoint the CC majority.  Id. 
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 Id.  
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constitutions, so environmental claims are more likely to receive fair 
adjudication.  If this turns out to be accurate, it follows that the 
environmental provisions would carry more meaning and boast a higher 
chance of success.   
2. Recent Case Law Suggests That Ecuador’s Constitutional Court May 
Now Be Capable of Independent Adjudication of Environmental 
Claims 
A recent CC decision proves that successful environmental litigation 
might now be possible.  In December 2008, just a few months after the 
amendments passed, the CC ruled139 on an environmental case that began a 
year before President Correa took office and two years before the new 
Constitution was passed.140  In November 2006, Ecuador’s Ministry of the 
Environment authorized construction of a new dam project.141  If completed, 
the Baba Dam Project (a series of dikes, dams and canals) would stretch 
from Quito to Guayaquil.142  A reservoir dam would be built alongside a 
hydroelectric generating plant, which would create a flood zone of 2,500 
acres143—thereby displacing several hundred people in the Los Rios 
province, including two indigenous communities.144  Downstream, 
thousands could lose their fisheries and farms for lack of water.  Riverside 
communities face an increased risk of malaria,145 poor water quality and 
water shortages.146  The project would also destroy the habitat of several 
endangered animal species and more than twenty endemic plant species.147  
Despite these threats, Ecuador’s Ministry of Environment granted the project 
a license to proceed in November 2006.148  Soon thereafter, Ecuadorean non-
                                           
139
 Resolution No. 1212-2007-RA, http://www.aida-americas.org/sites/default/files/Fallo%20 
BABA_12_2008.pdf 
140
 Since this case began before the new environmental provisions took effect, the plaintiffs could not 
utilize the new provisions in their argument.  However, the case nevertheless demonstrates improved 
independence in the judiciary, and thus supports this comment’s conclusion that the new environmental 
provisions probably face increase chances of success under President Correa’s new Constitutional scheme 
than under previous conditions.   
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 Constitutional Court Orders Change in Environmental License for Baba Dam, Ecuador, FIAN 
(Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.fian.org/news/press-releases/constitutional-court-orders-change-in-
environmental-licence-for-baba-dam-ecuador [hereinafter Constitutional Court Orders Change]. 
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 A River in Peril: The Baba Dam Project, AIDA (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.aida-
americas.org/en/project/babadam [hereinafter A River in Peril]. 
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 Constitutional Court Orders Change, supra note 141. 
144
 A River in Peril, supra note 142. 
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 Victories in Chile, Ecuador and Russia, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ALLIANCE WORLDWIDE  (June 13, 
2007), http://www.elaw.org/node/690. 
146
 A River in Peril, supra note 142.  
147
 Resolution 1212-2007-RA, supra note 139; AIDA, supra note 142. 
148
 AIDA, supra note 142. 
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profit ECOLEX149 filed suit.  
The initial judge rejected ECOLEX’s claims that the project violated 
human rights to water, food, work, and a safe environment,150 and that the 
project’s environmental impact assessments were incomplete, inaccurate, 
and failed to meet national and international standards.151  ECOLEX 
appealed to the CC.152  This time, international human rights organizations 
submitted amicus briefs in support of ECOLEX; the briefs contained expert 
conclusions that serious flaws in the studies assessing the risks the dam 
posed to Ecuadorean biodiversity had contaminated the results.153  Unlike 
the first judge, the CC concluded “the manner in which the Baba project had 
been authorized and implemented constituted a violation of human rights, 
including the rights to a healthy environment, to consultation and to citizen 
participation.”154  The CC halted the project, ordered the Ministry of the 
Environment to reevaluate the environmental impact statements and social 
impact studies, and ordered the Attorney General to audit the procedures and 
approval of the environmental impact evaluations.155  ECOLEX called the 
decision “outstanding news,” and expects the ruling to serve as precedent for 
other projects in Ecuador that affect environmental and human rights.156   
The significance of the CC’s Baba Dam decision is complex, despite 
ECOLEX’s optimism.  On one hand, enforcement of the ruling is not secure:  
the Ecuadorean government is moving forward with the project even though 
the court-ordered revisions are not complete, and an audit by the 
Comptroller’s Office showed that the project plans lacked measures to 
mitigate environmental harm.157  As a result of the government’s 
disobedience, ECOLEX has sought advice on strategies for ensuring the 
CC’s ruling is actually enforced.158  However, ECOLEX faces an uphill 
battle:  although amparo laws in Ecuador ostensibly obligate a defendant to 
obey a ruling, the amparo judges “do not have the power to directly impose 
                                           
149
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disciplinary or criminal sanctions [on] those that disobey their orders.”159  
Instead, the interested party must seek out the initiation in the criminal 
courts of a judicial criminal procedure against the disobedient party, which 
in this case is the government.160  
On the other hand, the CC’s decision represents a huge step forward in 
its judicial independence.  No data indicates that members voted based on 
their political ties, and the CC reprimanded the government (the Ministry of 
the Environment) by holding its procedures inefficient under the 
constitution.  In sum, the Baba Dam decision may mean the new CC will 
finally serve as a fair forum for plaintiffs to bring their environmental 
claims, even if enforcement issues remain unresolved.  
3. President Correa’s New Court is an Improvement, but Corruption 
Continues to Threaten Objectivity 
Despite this progress, grim realities persist, as a politically 
compromised judiciary is not a plaintiff’s only problem.  Even if judicial 
independence has improved under the 2008 Constitution, external corruption 
of Ecuador’s judiciary has not.161  A 2009 Human Rights Watch Report 
concluded that, although the 2008 Constitution provided the Judicial Council 
with more oversight powers over the judiciary as well as prosecutors and 
private attorneys, “the judiciary continued to operate slowly162 and 
inconsistently.  There were lengthy delays before most cases came to 
trial.”163  Another 2009 report by the U.S. State Department reported that 
official corruption is “a serious problem” in Ecuador,164 and that the judges 
often accepted bribes for favorable decisions.165  The Ecuadorean media has 
often reported on judges “parceling out cases to outside lawyers who wrote 
judicial sentences on cases before the court and sent them back to the 
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presiding judge for signature.”166 
This problem is not new to Ecuador or Latin America  in 2001, the 
United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention released a study of 
judicial corruption167 in Ecuador, Argentina and Venezuela that revealed high 
frequency of both administrative168 and operational169 corruption in 
Ecuador.170  According to a World Bank report, Ecuador’s percentile ranking 
for “control of corruption” has declined steadily since 1998, which suggests 
“that the political trajectory of the country is far from settled and that there 
are fundamental underlying issues that the society must address.”171  
The significance of this data in the context of the 2008 amendments is 
that plaintiffs suing under constitutional provisions, such as the new 
environmental provisions, face a huge hurdle to fair adjudication of their 
claims, since “a vast majority of the population is not [financially] able to 
offer illicit payoffs to government officials, even when they are willing to do 
so.”172  This seems especially true for environmental plaintiffs, who are 
likely to be non-profits and NGOs operating on shoe-string litigation 
budgets.  As a result, environmental plaintiffs, who are unwilling or unable 
to “supply illicit incentives will be excluded from the provision of a ‘public 
good’ (e.g., court services)” and constitutional mandates, and the 
constitutional mandates will cease to hold practical meaning.  In summary, 
Ecuador’s history of judicial corruption and political entrenchment pose 
serious hurdles for environmental plaintiffs.  The above history suggests 
plaintiffs cannot rely on the court system to enforce nature’s rights, and that 
the provisions could remain lip service until Ecuador’s constitutional 
tribunal proves it can function independently, reliably, and with integrity. 
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IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO NON-ENFORCEMENT: ECUADOR’S CHANCES 
OF SUCCESSFUL IMPLEMENTATION WILL INCREASE IF THE COUNTRY 
IMPLEMENTS A NUMBER OF REFORMS 
The world is watching to see how Ecuador will implement these novel 
constitutional amendments.  As detailed above, several obstacles hamper 
implementation:  1) Ecuador’s lack of a standing doctrine; 2) the 
amendments’ textual vagueness; 3) dysfunctional politics; 4) corruption and 
manipulation of the judiciary; and 5) policy barriers like economic 
instability and doubts regarding President Correa’s sincerity.  This section 
proposes some potential solutions to the above factors.173  
First, Ecuador should grant its CC members life tenure.  Permanent 
office for CC members will increase the judiciary’s independence and boost 
the chances of fair adjudication of environmental claims.  Second, Ecuador 
should codify an “open” standing doctrine to alleviate the procedural 
confusion surrounding litigation of the amendments.  Finally, Ecuador 
should create an independent enforcement body and a specialized tribunal 
with criminal contempt powers. 
A. Ecuador’s Constitutional Court Members Should Receive Lifetime 
Tenure to Improve Judicial Independence and Increase the Chances of 
Fair Adjudication of Environmental Claims 
Among the above factors hampering the amendments’ 
implementation, the primary obstacle is Ecuador’s pattern of judicial 
dysfunction.174  The judiciary’s functionality is acutely important to the 
success of these amendments because environmental disputes so often carry 
political and economic repercussions with the potential of sparking political 
backlash.175  Courts assessing environmental claims often must weigh 
competing policy interests that affect political agendas because fashioning a 
remedy for a claimant often requires the court to choose between the 
environmental interests at issue and the community’s present and future 
economic and social interests.176  The stakes are particularly high in 
environmental disputes: a plaintiff’s verdict can mean loss of political 
                                           
173
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station or, in some parts of the world, death for jurists and litigants alike.177  
For example, in 2000, a former Ecuadorean Supreme Court Justice noted the 
reasonable likelihood that the Ecuadorean military, which is funded by oil 
revenues, would harass the Texaco plaintiffs if they brought suit in 
Ecuador.178   Thus, lifetime tenure would allow the judiciary to decide cases 
on the merits, rather than fears of political or personal ramifications.   
1. Lifetime Tenure Will Increase Judicial Independence and Improve the 
Economy 
As a general rule, where the judiciary is ineffective, advancements in 
substantive law may make little difference.179  Furthermore, research shows 
that independent judiciaries correlate with economic growth:  strong 
judiciaries lead to improved credit markets and the growth of both big and 
small business because firms trust those courts to enforce agreements.180  
Ecuador’s business sector currently distrusts the courts.  Surveys reveal that 
investment firms in Ecuador are “reluctant to switch suppliers, even if 
offered a lower price, for fear [that] they could not turn to the courts” for 
enforcement of their contracts.181  Thus, a stronger judiciary in Ecuador will 
aid implementation of the new environmental provisions in two ways—by 
allowing for more consistent application of substantive law and by 
improving Ecuador’s economy so that the government has more money to 
implement environmental protection programs, policies, and legislation.  
The solution of granting CC members lifetime tenures therefore helps solve 
the problem of how Ecuador can simultaneously protect natural resources 
and sustain the economy.   
As Alexander Hamilton182 stated, “nothing can contribute so much 
to . . . firmness and independence as permanency in office.”183  Thus, to 
improve the judiciary and increase judicial independence, Ecuador must 
protect its CC Justices from executive and legislative impeachment by 
granting lifetime tenure.184  Lifetime tenure is critical if Ecuador is to restore 
stability and eliminate corruption from its judiciary.  Plaintiffs must be able 
bring constitutional claims before a fair and efficient judiciary that rules on 
                                           
177
 Id. at 433.  
178
 Cohan, supra note 161, at 161.  
179
 Dam, supra note 79, at 3.  
180
 Id. at 1-2. 
181
 Id. at 2. 
182
  A “founding father” of the United States.   
183
 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), available at 
http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/fed78.htm (last visited March 18, 2011).   
184
 Lifetime tenure should be codified and then included in the next constitutional amendment. 
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the case’s merits—not the politics of the moment.  Throughout the CC’s 
history, the length of members’ tenure has varied with different 
constitutional amendments.  Between 1945 and 1992, members served two-
and four-year terms.185  Since 2008, CC justices have served nine-year 
terms, and one-third of the CC is replaced every 3 years.186  Though nine-
year terms are certainly an improvement, nine years are still insufficient, as 
“experience has demonstrated that an independent judiciary rests on a 
permanent corps of judges who can be removed only for cause.”187   
The need for lifetime tenure is especially strong in developing 
countries with historically weak judiciaries, like Ecuador.188  Lifetime tenure 
cultivates judicial independence in these developing nations “because it 
gives [judges] economic security and frees them from undesirable pressures, 
whether from government, politicians, or private parties.”189  Thus, given the 
history of political entrenchment in Ecuador’s judiciary (detailed above in 
Part II.C.) this solution is especially appropriate.  Such a reform would allow 
CC Justices the freedom to eliminate all political influences from their 
decisions without fear of financial, professional, or political repercussions.  
Further, this job security would increase the prestige of Ecuador’s judiciary 
by making it a more dependable career path.  This increased prestige can in 
turn increase the CC’s independence because “a judiciary without 
independence is likely to lack prestige in the legal profession, and law 
graduates may in turn avoid a career in a judiciary lacking independence.”190  
Statistics of judicial dependence from other parts of Latin America 
support this solution of lifetime tenure.  In Peru, for example, President 
Fujimori kept more than half the country’s judges on temporary appointment 
between 1992 and 2002; not surprisingly, Peru’s judiciary is consistently 
rated as the least independent in Latin America.191  Argentina’s situation is 
not unlike Ecuador’s.  Between 1946 and 1994, Argentina’s Court was 
completely replaced six times by successive Presidents.192  Research shows 
that this cycle contributed to Argentina’s decline from one of the world’s ten 
wealthiest countries to one of the world’s poorest.193 
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2. Criticisms of Lifetime Tenure Do Not Apply to Ecuador 
Of course, the life tenure approach has its critics.  Some argue that 
appointments for life have often served as “an opportunity for patronage,” as 
seen in the United States.194  Consequently, judicial appointments in the 
United States often end up serving a political purpose, and Congress is more 
likely to appoint new federal judges when the President’s party holds a 
Congressional majority.195  Life tenure actually appears to counteract judicial 
independence, the argument goes, because judges can become political 
pawns for life.  
However, patronage concerns are less likely to apply in Ecuador 
because the country’s party system is so fragmented.  Studies show that 
between 1979 and 2004, Ecuador had the second most fragmented political 
system in Latin American after Brazil,196 with some twenty-two political 
parties jostling for power.197  During that period, the President’s political 
party controlled, on average, only 26% of the legislative seats, and no 
president ever held a congressional majority.198  This fragmentation means 
that lifetime appointments pose little risk of patronage in Ecuador, since it is 
unlikely that future presidents will hold enough power in Congress to 
manipulate judicial appointments.  In fact, the party system was so highly 
                                                                                                                              
Argentina and the Rise of Populism in Argentina: An Explanation for Argentina’s Economic Slide From the 
Top Ten,  (Univ. of Co. Institute of Behavior Science, Research Program on Pol. & Econ. Change, Working 
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they trust the judiciary will uphold their rights. Dam, supra note 79 at 3 (citing Jonathan Wheatley, 
“Brazil’s Judicial Nightmare Brings Gridlock for Growth,”  Financial Times, May 24, 2005).  Further, 
surveys show that investment firms in Ecuador “would be reluctant to switch suppliers, even if offered a 
lower price, for fear they could not turn to the courts to enforce the agreement.” Dam, supra note 79, at 2.  
Thus, since money Ecuador spends on its judiciary will ultimately improve its entire economy, Ecuador 
should not hesitate to transition to a lifetime tenure appointment system and prohibit any decrease in 
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fragmented at the time President Correa took office that it is a virtual 
certainty that he will not achieve a majority in Congress.199 
B. Ecuador Should Codify an “Open” Standing Doctrine to Give Effect 
to the Amendments’ Purpose 
 As discussed above in Part III.C., a major obstacle for plaintiffs suing 
under the new environmental provisions is that environmental rights, even 
the most anthropocentric ones, are difficult to implement and enforce.  The 
absence of a clear standing doctrine in Ecuador makes this already difficult 
task even more complicated.  Before the new provisions can have bite, 
Ecuador must codify standing guidelines upon which plaintiffs could rely. 200  
1. Codifying a Liberal, or “Open,” Standing Doctrine Will Reassure 
Plaintiffs That Environmental Litigation Is Worth It 
Standing doctrines are essential because they give procedural teeth to 
substantive rights, hence creating procedural rights that promote the 
transparency and accountability that are indispensable in effective 
environmental governance.201  Without clear standing requirements, 
plaintiffs could spend years on a lawsuit only to have a judge toss it out for 
lack of standing.  It is reasonable to conclude that few plaintiffs will take this 
risk until Ecuador’s standing doctrine is less vague.  Indeed, standing is 
difficult for environmental plaintiffs in general,202 and even more so for 
Ecuadorean plaintiffs suing under the new provisions, since they cannot 
know what the provisions require them to prove.  Additionally, Ecuador’s 
new amendment is somewhat of a puzzle because the legal community has 
little experience conceptualizing “how to enforce a right that is, by its very 
definition, not connected to a human concern.”203  In short, Ecuador must 
codify its standing doctrine before the amendments can mean anything.204 
a.  Open standing would effectuate the amendments’ aims  
To achieve the purpose of the amendments, Ecuador should codify an 
open standing doctrine as opposed to a more restrictive doctrine that imposes 
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strict requirements on plaintiffs.  An open standing doctrine will aid the 
amendments’ enforcement because “the broader or more lenient the standing 
requirements . . . the more likely that a constitutional right will be 
enforced.”205  Under open standing, any individual could defend nature’s 
rights, regardless of whether that plaintiff could demonstrate any direct 
personal harm.206   
An open standing doctrine makes the most sense for an amendment 
that purports to grant a remedy to non-human entities.  Under this doctrine, 
plaintiffs would not be bound to the stringent standing requirements 
employed by U.S. courts, as those requirements could not realize the aim of 
providing a remedy to the environment itself.  Thus, despite criticisms of an 
open standing doctrine, which warn of frivolous claims and bad precedent,207 
open standing would best implement the amendments’ aims.   
In codifying “open” standing, Ecuador would be following in the 
footsteps of countries that have already found success with such a doctrine 
in the adjudication of environmental claims.  For instance, the Supreme 
Court of Chile held in a 1997 decision known as the Trillium case that the 
Chilean government violated the country’s constitutional right to live in an 
environment free from contamination when it approved a project allowing 
270,000 hectares of forests to be logged.208  The Court granted standing to 
the plaintiffs (individuals209 and environmental groups210) despite the fact 
that none had suffered any personal injury, explaining that the constitutional 
right to a clean environment was owed to all citizens.211  The Supreme Court 
of Peru likewise granted open standing to a group of citizens in the 
environmental case Proterra v. Ferroaleaciones San Ramon S.A in 1992. 212  
India, South Africa, and the Philippines also grant liberal standing in 
environmental cases.213 
                                           
205
 May & Daly, supra note 105, at 416.  
206
 Bassi, supra note 46, at 465. 
207
 See, e.g., Bassi, supra note 46, at 465.   
208
 May & Daly, supra note 105, at 392 (citing The “Trillium Case,” Decision No. 2.732-96, at 8, 
Supreme Court, Mar. 19, 1997 (Chile), available at http://www.elaw.org/node/1310). 
209
 Oliver A. Houck, A Case of Sustainable Development: The River God and the Forest at the End of 
the World, 44 TULSA L. REV. 275, 307 (2008). 
210
 Gideon Long, Saving Chile’s Southern Wilderness, BBC NEWS (Feb. 25, 2009), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7853076.stm. 
211
 May & Daly, supra note 105, at 392-93. The benefit of Chile’s grant of open standing and 
accepting the case was the preservation of some of the world’s last remaining cold-climate virgin forests.  
Id.  
212
 Id. at 393 (citing Proterra v. Ferroaleaciones San Ramon S.A., Judgment No. 1156-90, Supreme 
Court, Nov. 19, 1992 (Peru)). 
213
 May & Daly, supra note 105, at 398, 405-406, 416.  South Africa’s court, however, has not yet 
enforced the right. Id. at 406. 
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b.  Ecuador should also adopt the “precautionary principle” as part of 
its standing doctrine  
Furthermore, Ecuador could strengthen the effect of the new 
environmental provisions and help effect the meaning and aim of the 
amendments by embracing the “precautionary principle.”  The precautionary 
principle holds that “where there is a threat of significant reduction or loss 
[to the environment], lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize such a threat.”214 If 
courts in Ecuador applied this principle, plaintiffs could earn standing even 
if they could not demonstrate that tangible harm to the environment had 
already occurred.  This concept of precautionary standing is connected to the 
concept of future generations. In other words, plaintiffs could sue before 
harm occurs because an inability to do so would threaten the constitutional 
rights to a safe environmental that the constitution grants future generations.   
Furthermore, the fact that courts in other countries such as Hungary 
and Pakistan already apply the precautionary principle to environmental 
rights cases shows that courts properly apply the principle to “help head off 
the problems associated with having to prove causation in environmental 
rights cases.”215  Proving causation is often legally complex, time-
consuming, and expensive.216  Legal services agencies in developing 
countries like Ecuador often lack the resources to do so because 
environmental litigation is almost always scientifically and administratively 
complex.217 In short, Ecuador’s ability to implement these new 
environmental provisions would greatly improve if the legislature codified 
guidelines for suits that included an explanation and requirement of the 
precautionary principle.   
C. Given Problems with Both National and Local Implementation in 
Developing Countries, Ecuador Should Create an Independent 
Enforcement Body and a Specialized Tribunal 
Another threshold issue is which organized body should lead 
enforcement on the ground once the CC issues environmental rulings; 
essentially, the question is whether national or local government should call 
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the shots.  Unfortunately, the answer seems to be neither, as both local and 
national implementation management will struggle in Ecuador because of its 
weak legal and political systems.  Ecuador should therefore implement an 
independent body of enforcement.   
1. Neither Local Nor National Implementation Is Likely to Succeed 
Because of Ecuador’s Fragile Political and Legal Structures   
Research shows that environmental problems in developing countries 
often stem from institutional problems,218 and Ecuador is no exception.  
Research shows that Ecuador’s “weak tenurial regimes…induce a cycle of 
excessive land clearing and inadequate resources conservation.”219  Although 
national governments tend to efficiently tackle certain objectives, like 
military organization and urban development, they often lack motivation to 
spend the amount of money necessary to protect the environment.220  This 
seems especially true in low-income nations like Ecuador, where debt is high 
and poverty is rampant.221  Consequently, many scholars feel that the 
“fences-and-lines” approach, where authority over natural resources falls to 
central government, usually does not work in low-income countries.222 
Ecuador might be the rare exception because President Correa may be 
politically motivated to conserve resources since indigenous groups 
comprise a large portion of his constituency.223  Nevertheless, “corrupt and 
inefficient bureaucracies can undermine conservation on the ground.”224  
Herein lies Ecuador’s problem:  it has made big promises that are hard to 
implement.   
Unfortunately, local resource management may not be a solution 
either.  Current research shows that “most [communities] are probably too 
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weak to resist the temptation to overuse their resources or to overcome 
outsiders seeking to exploit or control the resources.225   In short, in much of 
Latin America, both national and local government systems are weak and 
undependable.226  
2. Ecuador Needs an Independent Enforcement Body to Implement the 
Amendments and Prevent Future Corruption   
Ecuador should implement an independent enforcement body, 
separate from both national and local government, lead enforcement of the 
amendments on the ground, and finally, bring the government into 
compliance with its own constitution.  An independent body is an 
appropriate solution to the enforcement problem because the Ecuadorean 
public distrusts the political system.227  Public opinion polls show that the 
public has felt alienated from politics for the past decade:  in three 
successive audits, Ecuadoreans expressed a profound lack of confidence in 
the ‘central nucleus’ of the political system:  the national government, 
congress, and political parties.  Not surprisingly, the lack of confidence went 
hand in hand with a widely shared view that politicians were corrupt.228  
Since Ecuadoreans lack confidence in the political system’s ability to act on 
its promises, an independent body would be the appropriate vehicle to 
restore the public’s trust in government and to encourage plaintiffs to bring 
environmental claims when they are warranted.  
This independent body would need legal standing to trace a ruling 
from the CC to the communities and to ensure that Ecuador adhered to the 
CC’s mandates.  The people comprising this body would need to possess a 
professional background in environmental law and ideally constitutional law.  
More importantly, they would need to lack any political affiliations that 
would compromise their objectivity, in order to effectively enforce the CC’s 
environmental rulings and avoid the entrenchment that corrupted the 
judiciary.  This new body will increase the effectiveness of the 
environmental provisions because Ecuadoreans will see that their lawsuits 
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matter, have a lasting effect, and are not a waste of their time and money. 
3. Ecuador Should Create a Specialized Environmental Court with 
Power of Criminal Contempt to Aid Enforcement   
In light of Ecuador’s fickle judicial setting, Ecuador should create a 
specialized environmental tribunal to implement the amendments.  These 
specialized courts could develop their own requirements for both standing 
and the admission of evidence, both of which tend to cause problems for 
plaintiffs for reasons discussed elsewhere in this comment.229  If staffed by 
judges with environmental or scientific expertise, these tribunals could give 
a more fair trial to parties on both sides of the litigation.  Additionally, “with 
added expertise, the courts would benefit from increased social legitimacy, 
and would thereby have the power to issue broader, more creative orders to 
remedy environmental violations.”230  A specialized court is also better able 
to avoid the entrenchment and dysfunction characteristic of the 
constitutional court; by deciding only environmental cases, the court would 
dodge pressure from other branches of government that the constitutional 
court must battle when deciding politically-charged cases.   
To maximize its effectiveness, this court must have criminal contempt 
power—or the power to impose criminal sanctions for violations of its 
rulings.  Criminal contempt is considered one of the most important features 
of an injunctive relief system.231  In the United States, criminal contempt 
power is part of what makes an injunction effective; the same court that 
issues a ruling can also punish violations of that ruling with imprisonment or 
fines.232  Amparo judges in Ecuador do not have this power,233 so disobedient 
parties, like the government in the Baba Dam case, have no incentive to 
obey a ruling because they face no sanctions.  As Justice Brewer of the 
United States Supreme Court said, to compel obedience, courts “must have 
the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedience…To submit the 
question of disobedience to another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, 
would operate to deprive the proceedings of half its efficiency.”234  In sum, 
granting the power of criminal contempt to this independent environmental 
court will give the amendments teeth because violators will actually have a 
motivation to comply with court rulings.   
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V. CONCLUSION 
 Ecuador’s 2008 constitutional amendments may have accomplished 
something historic.  No other country has gone so far to protect the 
environment.  If the amendments are enforced, they could transform legal 
treatment of the environment.  Unfortunately, Ecuador’s President seems 
more focused on the economy than the constitution.235  Additionally, 
procedural confusion and half a century of political chaos mean that these 
amendments will likely linger in the constitution without any real bite.  This 
comment argues that Ecuador’s amendments are more likely to have an 
impact if Ecuador implements structural and procedural changes.  These 
changes may not take hold for several generations, if ever.  Regardless, 
Ecuador’s new Constitution paves the way for potentially transformative 
environmental change in the future.  
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